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Abstract3
We explore the contribution made by oscillatory, synchronous neu-4
ral activity to representation in the brain. We closely examine six5
prominent examples of brain function in which neural oscillations play6
a central role, and identify two levels of involvement that these oscil-7
lations take in the emergence of representations: enabling (when oscil-8
lations help to establish a communication channel between sender and9
receiver, or are causally involved in triggering a representation) and10
properly representational (when oscillations are a constitutive part of11
the representation).12
We show that even an idealized informational sender-receiver ac-13
count of representation makes the representational status of oscilla-14
tions a non-trivial matter, which depends on rather minute empirical15
details.16
1 Introduction17
A foundational hypothesis in cognitive science is that cognition progresses18
through the manipulation of representations: entities that are about, or stand19
for, other, generally extra-mental entities (Frankish and Ramsey 2012). Ac-20
cording to this hypothesis, information about the external world flows through21
the brain, encoded somehow in its states, modulating behavior in increasingly22
sophisticated ways. Much cognitive science aims at identifying those brain23
states, and uncovering their content—what it is that they say about the exter-24
nal world. In its turn, one of the central research programs in the philosophy25
of cognitive science aims at formulating a metaphysics of representations:26
what needs to be the case for a certain vehicle to qualify as a representa-27
tional state? What determines its representational content? (Cummins 1991;28
Ramsey 2007; Shea 2018)29
1
The paragraph above is written in the abstract way characteristic of philo-30
sophical discussion on representations (e.g. Fodor 1974; Pylyshyn 1984); one31
that glosses over particular details of implementation. For example, philoso-32
phers often use the term ‘vehicle’ with the intention that it range over all33
possibly representational brain states (say, single neurons, populations of neu-34
rons, or neurotransmitter discharges) and all possible encodings (say, rate-35
or phase-based). Studying the metaphysics of representation in such non-36
committal terms is methodologically smart: it allows the resulting theory to37
apply to vehicles in general, and to capture whatever is common to all in-38
stances of representation in the brain. On the other hand, this approach tends39
to neglect the particular way in which representations are implemented, and40
the keys those particular ways might hold to the more general question of41
representation—apart from their intrinsic theoretical interest (Craver 2007;42
Boone and Piccinini 2016).43
In this paper we redress this situation with respect to one very interesting,44
philosophically underexplored kind of vehicle. Frequently, brain activity is or-45
ganized into synchronous, quasi-periodic patterns of activation which appear46
to contribute to many aspects of cognition, from pre-attentional grouping47
(Jensen, Kaiser, and Lachaux 2007; Zion Golumbic et al. 2013; Fries 2015;48
Pritchett et al. 2015) to the construction and modification of spatial maps in49
the hippocampus (Skaggs et al. 1996; Colgin et al. 2004). The question that50
will interest us here is whether these contributions are representational: do51
synchronous, periodic patterns of activity (we will call them ‘neural oscilla-52
tions’, for brevity) in and of themselves constitute representations?53
Investigation of these implementational details is not only interesting in54
its own right; it can also help philosophers reach conclusions about represen-55
tation in general. In particular, the results of this paper can be used as a56
response to the ‘trivialization’ objection against naturalistic theories of con-57
tent: many theorists have recently argued that theories that try to explain58
the notion of ‘representation’ in terms of functions, information, or causal re-59
lations (for example, teleosemantic approaches) are too liberal. According to60
this complain, if representational status merely depended on the presence of61
these features, almost any brain event would qualify as such (Ramsey 2007;62
Burge 2010; Schulte 2017; Gładziejewski and Miłkowski 2017; Butlin 2018;63
Williams and Colling 2018). This outcome would trivialize the notion of ‘rep-64
resentation’ and would put its explanatory role into question. Partly for this65
reason, some of these theorists suggest that attribution of representational66
status should be restricted to relatively sophisticated processes, such as those67
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involving map-like structures or constancy mechanisms.68
Neural oscillations show this to be a hasty conclusion: as we will see, under69
an understanding of representations that would certainly count as liberal70
by those theorists’ lights, some forms of simple oscillatory processes qualify71
as representational, whereas others do not. “Liberal” naturalistic theories of72
content can draw a meaningful, non-trivial distinction between brain events73
that are genuinely representational and those that are not.74
Our paper is structured in six main sections. In section 2 we sketch our75
preferred general approach to the question of the metaphysics of representa-76
tion. Our aim in this section is not to offer a fully developed metasemantics77
but, rather, to identify a common core to which many theorists working on78
this topic adhere. This common core will be enough to distinguish two roles79
neural oscillations can play, in the process of generating representations: we80
call them enabling and properly representational. We present these roles in81
section 3. The following two sections consider some scientifically prominent82
cases of brain function, with the goal of ascertaining which one, if any, of83
these roles neural oscillations play in them: section 4 discusses neural oscilla-84
tions that probably play an enabling role; and section 5 deals with what, we85
argue, are the properly representational cases. This taxonomy exemplifies a86
second lesson about the usefulness of investigating particular details of imple-87
mentation for the study of representations in general: while we have arrived88
at it from the consideration of rather minute such details, it is not unreason-89
able to think that it will prove helpful in the investigation and description of90
many other, unrelated representational phenomena. Section 6 wraps up and91
offers some conclusions.92
2 The core metaphysics of content93
In subsequent sections we will ask of certain kinds of brain activity whether94
they count or not as representations. In order to answer this question, we95
need a theory of what makes a certain state representational. A substantial96
discussion of this question is well beyond the scope of this paper; instead,97
we will present, without argument, two tenets that are widely (though by no98
means universally) thought to be part of what it is for a representation to be99
a representation. These tenets are most closely related with so-called teleose-100
mantic naturalistic metasemantics (Millikan 1984; Papineau 1987; Neander101
2017) but they also draw from the partially overlapping signaling games102
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framework (Skyrms 2010; Godfrey-Smith 2014).103
The first tenet is that all representational systems share an architectural104
motif: in all of them, representational vehicles, or ‘signals’, mediate between105
a mechanism producing the representation (called ‘sender’ or ‘producer’) and106
a mechanism using the representation (‘receiver’ or ‘consumer’). For a mech-107
anism to qualify as a sender or a receiver, it needs to have the right sort of108
biological function: the sender’s function is, roughly, to emit the above me-109
diating signals when certain states of affairs obtains, whereas the receiver’s110
functions is, roughly, to act in certain ways upon reception of the signal.111
The content of the representation will be fixed, among other things, by112
the relation it bears to the behavior of the producer/sender and the con-113
sumer/receiver. Although the specification of these relations vary from ac-114
count to account, information generated in the external world flowing from115
producer to the representation, and from the representation to the consumer,116
is usually taken to play a role: under a first approximation, contents are fixed117
by the information that representations carry about the world, under some118
designated set of optimal conditions. What these optimal conditions amount119
to is somehow fixed by the receiver/consumer’s biological function—this is120
the second tenet.121
Putting these two ideas together, our metasemantic sketch says that a122
certain mental vehicle, V, is a representation if:123
1. V is an intermediate state in a sender-receiver architecture, and124
2. V helps fulfil its consumer/receiver’s biological function by carrying the125
information that the state of affairs S is the case (information which126
has flown to V through its producer/sender)127
In such a situation, moreover, we may say that the content of V is that128
S is the case. In this paper, though, our main focus will be on establish-129
ing that certain neural oscillations are representations, and not so much on130
ascertaining their content.131
This metasemantic sketch is heavily simplified—Ruth Millikan, and many132
other theorists after her, have been developing related ideas for the best part133
of four decades. Still, it is detailed enough to accommodate a number of134
properties that many associate with, or even take to be necessary for, the ex-135
istence of representations. First, the possibility of erroneous representation,136
or misrepresentation: this will happen, among other things, in some cases137
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of sender malfunction, the possibility of which is part and parcel of its hav-138
ing a biological function. Second, the fact that representations ought to be139
action-guiding—or, at least, somehow contribute to the production of behav-140
ior: this will fall out of understanding biological functions as contributions141
to the subsistence of the individual (Mossio, Saborido, and Moreno 2009)142
or contributions to selection for the functional device in question (Millikan143
2002). From section 4 onwards we will rely on these ideas in our discussion144
of the representational status of oscillations. Before that, we will briefly dis-145
tinguish two possible degrees of involvement for oscillations to have in the146
generation of representations.147
3 Enabling and representational roles148
The taxonomy we are about to present is not a theoretical assumption, but149
one of the results of the present investigation: after having surveyed many150
of the relevant empirical cases, it is the classification that suggests itself as151
most conducive to understanding and organizing the involvement of neu-152
ral oscillations in the generation of representations. In any event, of course,153
other useful taxonomies are certainly possible, and our preferred one does154
not aim at being exhaustive. The two roles under which we will classify the155
involvement of neural oscillations in representational phenomena are:156
Enabling: Neural oscillations enable or trigger the activation of a represen-157
tation.158
Representational: Neural oscillations properly are (or are a constitutive159
part of) a representation.160
First of all, neural oscillations play an enabling role when their main job161
is to help set up the communication channel between sender and receiver.162
To see what this means, we first note that a sender-receiver configuration163
is just a point-to-point information-processing pipeline in the Shannonian164
tradition (Shannon 1948; El Gamal and Kim 2011, section 3.1). Compare165
the entirely analogous figures 1 and 2. The sender/producer can be thought166
of as well as an encoder, and the receiver/consumer as a decoder. Efficient167
encoding/decoding is useful in order to get relevant information through in-168
herently noisy, limited-capacity channels, and some of the time it is coding-169
related roles that neural oscillations will play: for example, oscillations can170
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help communicate to the encoder/decoder what is the task-relevant informa-171
tion they should focus on communicating (this is related to what information172
theorists call a distortion measure—see Martínez (2019) for details). This is173
our interpretation of the phenomena discussed in Subsection 4.1. They can174
also constitute the mechanism that allows the brain to move from reading175
representations to writing them, and back (Subsection 4.2). A third kind of176
enabling role is to help build a representation, without being a proper part177
of it (Subsection 4.3). There are probably many other purely representation-178
enabling roles that neural oscillation can play.179
Source Encoder Channel Decoder
original message
M
signal signal decoded message
Mˆ
Figure 1: A point-to-point information-processing pipeline
World Sender Messages Receiver
state act
Figure 2: A sender-receiver model
The job of neural oscillations, however, is not limited to facilitating (or180
disrupting) communication. Sometimes they seem to play a bona fide repre-181
sentational role. In other words, they are a constitutive part of the vehicle182
of communication—of the signals in figure 1. Neural oscillations not only183
enable the flow of information, but also convey information themselves. In184
Subsections 5.1 and 5.2 we discuss two cases in which oscillatory phenom-185
ena not just enable but are representations. Finally, in Subsection 5.3 we186
take a step back and canvass the general role that oscillations play in the187




In this section we review cases in which oscillations provide background con-191
ditions for representations to exist, or are causally involved in the tokening192
of representations, without being themselves representational.193
4.1 Attention and Communication Through Coherence194
Attention is a kind of modulation of sensory processing, whereby incom-195
ing stimuli are preferentially processed, or ignored, based on their current196
saliency, or behavioral relevance to the perceiver (Treue 2001; Gilbert and Li197
2013). Attentional influence helps target finite and expensive computational198
resources in higher cognition to the treatment of those aspects of the incom-199
ing sensory stream that most directly affect the perceiver. “As a consequence200
the perceptual quality of a visual stimulus located within an attended region201
is improved . . . at the expense of the perceptual quality of stimuli located202
elsewhere . . . ” (Chalk et al. 2010, p. 114).203
Attentional influence on sensory processing has been demonstrated to204
exist as early on as V1 (Posner and Gilbert 1999) but probably not earlier205
than that (Alilović et al. 2019); this influence increases as we move on to206
higher visual areas (Maunsell and Cook 2002) although “the magnitude of207
attentional effects depends on the nature of the task and the configuration208
of the stimulus” (Gilbert and Li 2013, p. 352).209
Spatial attention is often directed to concrete spatial areas in the visual210
field. The once ubiquitous metaphor was that attention is like a ‘spotlight’: it211
illuminates the attended area and singles it out for further processing (Bre-212
fczynski and DeYoe 1999; Hurlbert and Poggio 1985) More recent research213
has uncovered some limitations of this spotlight metaphor. First, the spatial214
resolution of neurons decreases as we go up in the visual processing hier-215
archy (that is, the receptive field size of these neurons increases, Dumoulin216
and Wandell 2008): the higher the visual area, the bigger chunks of the visual217
fields particular neurons are affected to. This makes intuitive sense: these neu-218
rons are often, though not always, attuned to global properties of the visual219
scene—to its gist; and not so much to fine-grained details, say, of texture or220
color. This means that attention cannot be just a matter of upstream neurons221
specializing on (directing a spotlight to) smaller, spotlight-sized, visual-field222
regions. Furthermore, the existence of attentional mechanisms that target223
objects and features, and not spatial regions, has been amply demonstrated224
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(Maunsell and Treue 2006; O’Craven, Downing, and Kanwisher 1999; Treue225
and Trujillo 1999). Attentional mechanisms, therefore, somehow are able to226
single out, from the whole input to a neuron’s receptive field, a relevant227
subset of activity for further treatment.228
One of the most widely accepted hypothesis as to how attention ac-229
complishes this, Pascal Fries’s communication through coherence (also CTC230
henceforth, Fries 2005, 2015), relies on synchronized1 oscillations in the gamma231
band (or gamma oscillation, for short, Pritchett et al. 2015; Jensen, Kaiser,232
and Lachaux 2007; Fell et al. 2003; Zion Golumbic et al. 2013; Fries 2009). In233
this section we first discuss the mechanism by which synchronized oscillatory234
behavior is accomplished; then how this solves the problem that attention235
faces; and, finally, whether attention-related gamma oscillation could be plau-236
sibly regarded as representational.237
Gamma oscillation depends crucially on the behavior of fast-spiking in-238
hibitory interneurons (Pritchett et al. 2015; Fries 2009). Simplifying some-239
what current computational models of the emergence of oscillatory behavior240
(see, e.g., Börgers, Epstein, and Kopell 2008, for a fuller picture), the main241
idea is that a stimulus presentation excites a group of interneurons, which in242
turn inhibit a larger group of excitatory neurons in their vicinity. When the243
inhibition wears out (after approximately 15ms, hence the gamma frequency244
of the resulting rhythm, Pritchett et al. 2015, p. 254) there is a window of245
opportunity for the activity of excitatory neurons, which in turn generate the246
next cycle of inhibition by interneurons.247
Attention is hypothesized to work roughly as follows: the stimulus at-248
tended to by a population of neurons downstream, D, oscillating in the249
gamma band, is the one encoded by the population upstream, U , also oscil-250
lating and synchronized with D. The way in which this helps fix attention to251
the stimulus encoded by U is by enhancing the effective connectivity (Friston252
2011) between D and U (and impeding the connectivity between D and other253
possible neuronal populations upstream). First, focusing on the downstream254
neuron population, “input consistently arriving at high-gain phases benefits255
from enhanced effective connectivity” (Ni et al. 2016, p. 240). Second, focus-256
ing on the upstream population, “[presynaptic synchronization] . . . ensures257
that a presynaptic activation pattern arrives at postsynaptic neurons in a258
temporally coordinated manner” (Fries 2015), which in turn results in much259
enhanced impact in postsynaptic neurons because of feedforward coincidence260
1. Here, by “synchronized” we mean “in (delayed) coherence”, see Fries (2015).
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detection (Fries 2009). This is, in a nutshell, the mechanism that Fries calls261
CTC.262
Our main question is: are attention-related gamma oscillations represen-263
tational? To be precise, the putative representational vehicle is264
Vehicle: Populations U and D being synchronized in the gamma band.265
Under the simplified analysis of representations we are working with (as266
presented in section 2) a representation is, at least, a vehicle that mediates267
between a sender (or producer) and a receiver (or consumer). Now, on the268
one hand, it is possible to find a sender, or set of senders, for Vehicle. First,269
for saliency-based attention, the most salient stimulus is the one that will270
drive excitatory neurons most vigorously. This will kick off the process de-271
scribed above, that results in gamma oscillation for these neurons, which in272
turns “manages to entrain postsynaptic neurons and thereby achieves the in-273
crease in input gain at the postsynaptic neurons.” (Fries 2015, p. 226). The274
sender of the attentional vehicle, according to this picture, would be neural275
(e.g., retinal) activity vigorous enough to entrain gamma oscillation. For top-276
down attention, the CTC picture is somewhat less clear. Roughly, whatever277
volitional processes that result in a mandate to attend to a certain spatial278
region, feature or object would directly communicate with U (recall, this is279
the population of upstream, presynaptic neurons), causing them to synchro-280
nize, and thereby entraining D. The sender, according to this picture, would281
be something like the neural correlate of an intention to focus one’s attention282
on the feature encoded by D.283
But, on the other hand, it is very unlikely that Vehicle have a receiver:284
that D attends to U is not something that needs to be communicated to an-285
other area of the brain for further treatment. There is no further component286
that is sensitive to the synchronization and employs it to gather information287
about some state of the world. Here neural oscillations enable a better com-288
munication between two brain areas, but they are not supposed to represent289
or carry information about any particular aspect of the world. Attentional290
modulation of sensory processing is a very efficient way of optimizing the291
brain’s limited computational budget, but the information that this opti-292
mization might carry is of no use to other brain areas.2293
2. At least in usual cases, leaving aside comparatively uncommon situations of self-
monitoring of attention (Harris et al. 2005).
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Note that our claim here is just that Vehicle (that is, the actual neural-294
oscillatory implementation of attention) is not representational. We are not295
discussing other phenomena in the vicinity, such as, for example, the in-296
tention to focus our attention on some aspect of the visual field, which, as297
suggested above, could plausibly trigger an attentional process in some cases.298
The communication of this intention to neural population U could, for all we299
know, constitute an imperative representation with a content along the lines300
of “Attend to stimulus S!”. We will not discuss here this possible imperative301
representation3 among other things because the philosophical treatment of302
imperative representations is less mature than that of indicative ones. See303
Butlin (2018) and Artiga (2013) for related discussions.4304
What attention does falls squarely under channel management : given the305
available channel capacity from early vision to the extrastriate cortex, infor-306
mation relevant to current behavioral goals (top-down attention) or infor-307
mation that might potentially inform new behavioral goals (saliency-based308
attention) needs to be prioritized. Attention-related gamma oscillations play309
a purely enabling, non-representational role.310
4.2 Retrieval and encoding of cognitive maps311
Our second example concerns place cells. Research on these neurons began312
in the 1970s, when O’Keefe and Dostrovsy (1971) discovered that activity in313
some cells of the rat’s hippocampus (specially in areas CA1 and CA3) were314
not well correlated with significant events (such as food finding or lever press-315
ing), but were instead specially sensitive to location. Subsequent research has316
confirmed that these cells carry information about particular places and many317
have taken this to suggest that rats possess a cognitive map of the environ-318
ment (O’Keefe and Nadel 1978; Muller et al. 1994; McNaughton et al. 2006;319
Hartley et al. 2017).320
Cognitive maps must be stable enough that they can be re-used whenever321
the rat needs to navigate the same space. At the same time, in certain circum-322
stances (e.g. in new environments, or when familiar environments change in323
significant ways) a new map needs to be created, a process called ‘remapping’324
3. A representation which, by the way, would also be possibly mediated by gamma
synchrony, this time between the frontal eye field and V4 (Gregoriou et al. 2009). See
Baluch and Itti (2011) for a review of top-down influences in attention.
4. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for drawing our attention to this
point.
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(Muller and Kubie 1987). The exact circumstances that trigger remapping325
are not well understood, but it has been extensively shown that this process326
involves cells changing their place fields and establishing new connections327
between them. In case of global or complete remapping, the cell’s new place328
field does not bear any specific relationship with the previous one (Knierim329
2003; Latuske et al. 2018).330
The existence of remapping, however, raises a puzzle. When the rat needs331
to orient itself in a familiar environment, action needs to be driven by the332
information stored in the hippocampus and, when it finds itself in a new333
environment or when the old environment changes in significant ways, the334
new information needs to be stored. The problem, however, is that some of the335
very same brain regions containing place cells (e.g. C3, and CA1) are involved336
in both processes of encoding and retrieval (Leutgeb et al. 2005). How can a337
system deal with these two different goals? How can the hippocampus encode338
new information without interference from old memories, and retrieve an339
old map without interference from incoming input? One possible mechanism340
involves the use of neural oscillations.341
The entorhinal cortex (EC) is one of the main extrahippocampal relays de-342
livering new information to the hippocampus (Buhl and Whittington 2007).343
In encoding a new map, activity in the EC and CA1 is synchronized, meaning344
that cells in both regions tend to fire in-phase, whereas synaptic transmission345
between CA3 and CA1 is weak, which prevents interference. In contrast, in346
retrieval there is strong input from CA3 to CA1 and weak input from EC347
(Hasselmo, Bodelón, and Wyble 2002; Montgomery and Buzsáki 2007). In a348
nutshell, the idea is that, in encoding, oscillations are used in order to pro-349
mote the transmission of information between extrahippocampal areas and350
the hippocampus and inhibit interference from CA3, while, in retrieval, it is351
information between CA3 and CA1 that is privileged (Hasselmo and Stern352
2014; Colgin 2016). This seems, again, to be a clear example of communica-353
tion through coherence.354
Now, if this hypothesis is on the right track, what role are neural oscilla-355
tions playing? As in the case of attention reviewed earlier, here synchroniza-356
tion seems to to be the mechanism used for privileging the transmission of357
certain kinds of information: it facilitates communication between two neu-358
ronal assemblies and, at the same time, obstructs possible interferences from359
other brain areas. Neural oscillations do not seem to provide any new con-360
tent; they are just the mechanism that opens or closes the channels from two361
areas that store preexisting information or relay new information.362
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It is important to note that the fact that synchronized oscillation is estab-363
lished between CA1 and EC (CA3) does carry information about the system’s364
task currently being one of encoding (retrieval). It is sometimes suggested365
that the kind of metasemantic account sketched in Section 2 has the un-366
welcome consequence that most any informational connection will come out367
representational. Encoding/retrieval in the hippocampus shows this to be368
false: as no other part of the brain is receiving (or consuming, or decoding)369
this information, the relevant vehicle does not qualify as a representation.370
Again here, neural oscillations seem to play a merely enabling role.371
4.3 Theta precession in remapping372
Neural oscillations can also play a different sort of enabling role: sometimes373
they are instrumental in building a certain representation, but they are not374
themselves part of the actual representational vehicle. We offer theta preces-375
sion as an example of this kind of enabling.376
The mammal hippocampus presents a very strong pattern of oscillation377
in the theta frequency band, around 3–10 Hz (Buzsáki 2002). There appears378
to be a systematic timing relationship between the activities of single place379
cells in CA1 or CA3 and this background theta rhythm: O’Keefe and Recce380
(1993) found that as rats move through the place field corresponding to a381
certain place cell, the phase of spike trains of this cell tend to change their382
phase with respect to the background theta period: when the rat enters its383
place field, a place cell starts firing at the end of the first theta cycle, and384
subsequent spike trains progressively move forward, as the rat progresses385
through the field. By the time the rats leaves the place field, bursts might386
have advanced a whole cycle, i.e. almost 360◦, but never more, and most of387
the time the phase precession spans at most about 180◦ (O’Keefe and Recce388
1993; Maurer et al. 2006; Schmidt et al. 2009). This process is called ‘theta389
precession’ (Figure 3).390
Among the different proposals on offer about the role of theta precession391
(Jensen and Lisman 2000; Hasselmo 2005; Huxter, Senior, and Allen 2008;392
Jeewajee et al. 2014), another one of which we will discuss in Subsection 5.1,393
we will here focus on the relation between precession and remapping (Skaggs394
et al. 1996). Spatial representation in the hippocampus is not topological, in395
the sense that two cells that are close together are not more likely to represent396
adjacent areas than more distant cells. How can a stable map be formed397
in such a structure? How can distant neurons come to steadily represent398
12
Figure 3: The colored area in b represents the place field of a partic-
ular hippocampal place cell when the rat crosses the field
represented in a. c shows that place cell spikes (shown in
red) precess against the theta oscillations: firings begin near
the peak and progressively move earlier in subsequent cy-
cles (from Huxter, Burgess, and O’Keefe 2003).
adjacent locations and how are their connections established? William Skaggs399
and colleagues suggest that precession plays a key role.400
In short, the suggestion runs as follows. When the rat initiates a process401
of remapping, place cells lose they preferred place fields and gain new fields402
that bear no predictable relationship to the old ones. Suppose that a rat403
engages in remapping and in the new environment an A-cell fires when the404
rat is in location A.5 Here precession is to be expected: the first spike train405
will take place near the peak of the last gamma cycle within the first theta406
cycle,6 but in subsequent theta cycles the firing pattern will take place at407
earlier phases as the rat traverses the field. At some point the rat will enter408
a new place field B and a B-cell (which might be located far away from any409
A-cells) will become active. Now, due to precession these two cells will fire410
5. In this paper we follow the convention of calling the cell that represents, e.g., location
A an “A-cell”; mutatis mutandis for other cells and their place fields.
6. For more on the relation between theta and gamma cycles see Lisman and Jensen
(2013) and Section 5.3 below.
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in the order AB and, since place fields partly overlap, this pattern will be411
repeated several times as the rat moves (see figure 4).412
Figure 4: From Skaggs et al. 1996: 169. Explanation in the main text.
More generally, as the rat traverses a sequence of places ABCDE, the413
following pattern will emerge (vertical lines represent the beginning of a theta414
cycle): . . . |ABC|ABC|BCD|BCD|CDE|CDE . . . . Note that spike trains in415
the A-cell will systematically take place a bit earlier than spike trains in416
the B-cell (or vice versa, if the rat is traveling in the contrary direction).417
This short time span between the spikes of two cells that represent adjacent418
locations A and B is crucial because it will help strengthen the connections419
between A- and B-cells through long-term potentiation (LTP).7 It has been420
suggested that LTP reinforces better the synaptic connections from A-cell to421
B-cell when the A-cell fires slightly earlier in time than the B-cell (Larson422
and Lynch 1989). If this is true, precession might facilitate LTP between423
neurons that carry information about adjacent places and this might explain424
how maps can be formed in which cells located at a (relatively) long distance425
from each other represent nearby places (Skaggs et al. 1996; Bechtel 2016).426
Let us suppose that this explanation is on the right track. Do neural oscil-427
lations play a representational role here? We lean towards a negative answer:428
neural oscillations should be construed as a mechanism that enables the con-429
struction of a map-like representation, but are not part of it. Certainly, the430
stable time lag between spike bursts of A- and B-cells, afforded by their occu-431
pying different phases in the gamma cycle, is sensitive to (carries information432
7. Long-term potentiation is a persistent strengthening of synapses caused by co-
activation patterns (Cooke and Bliss 2006).
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about) the adjacency of the related place fields, but we suggest that this is433
not enough to credit the underlying oscillations with a representational role.434
There are two main reasons for this.435
First, LTP occurs whenever there is a particular temporal delay between436
the activity of two cells, independently of how this delay is produced. In437
LTP, timing, not phase, is essential: firings of A- and B-cells need to be suf-438
ficiently close in time and, for example, keeping phase-delay constant, LTP439
will happen if the oscillation is sufficiently fast, but not if it is too slow.440
Compare this with the cases of communication through coherence in atten-441
tion reviewed above: there, persistently rhythmic, coincident activity (and442
not merely a certain time lag) seemed to play an essential role in upstream443
neurons entraining downstream activity. The second reason is that, in this444
mechanism, there does not seem to be any receiver sensitive to oscillations as445
such. There is no internal downstream mechanism sensing this phase delay446
and using it go gain information that could be used in some computational447
process.448
5 Representational oscillations449
So far we have discussed cases in which neural oscillations play a role in450
bringing about representational phenomena without being representations451
themselves, but rather partly constituting the communicative scaffolding nec-452
essary for representations to emerge. In this section we present cases in which453
neural oscillations do seem to play a properly representational role.454
5.1 Theta precession in prediction455
Apart from its contribution to remapping, theta precession plays a second456
role that might qualify as genuinely representational. In their seminal paper,457
O’Keefe and Recce (1993) found that place cells tend to fire more vigor-458
ously in earlier phases of the background theta wave, as the rat approaches459
the center of their place field. In fact, they observed that the phase of the460
background theta wave at which place-cell activity is maximal appears to461
correlate much better with the exact location of the rat within the place field462
than with the time it has spent in it, or its velocity. Furthermore, in normal463
conditions this precession (i.e., the phenomenon by which the phase of pre-464
dominant place-cell activity moves towards the beginning of the theta wave)465
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vanishes when the rat is in the running wheel (Czurko et al. 1999; Hirase466
et al. 1999), which lends support to the idea that the relevant connection is467
not with its speed or the time it has spent in a place field, but with its lo-468
cation. As a result, some have suggested that theta phase is used to provide469
a more fine-grained representation of location: whereas activity in a given470
place cell indicates the broad area in which the rats finds itself (this would471
be rate coding), the degree of precession carries information about the rat’s472
location within the place field (and this would be phase coding). Jensen and473
Lisman (2000) provided further support for this hypothesis, when they used474
the activity recorded in 38 pyramidal cells to pinpoint the rats’ place within475
a linear track, and showed that by including phase information they could476
improve the accuracy by 43% (p. 2607). They were able to predict the rat’s477
position within a 2-meter track with a precision of 3 cm.478
Other, more recent work interprets the same results in a slightly differ-479
ent way: instead of taking them to support the idea that phase codes for480
fine-grained location information within one and the same place field, John481
Lisman and colleagues have claimed that phase coding is actually used to482
make predictions about which place field the rat is moving towards (Lisman483
and Redish 2009a; Lisman and Jensen 2013). This is, in a sense, a different484
gloss on the same main idea: you can think of place fields as being compar-485
atively big, and therefore interpret theta phase as coding for location within486
that field; or you can think of place fields as comparatively smaller, and then487
think of theta phase as predicting which place field the rate will be visiting488
next. Indeed, an important feature of the more recent Lisman and colleagues489
model is that “the ‘true place field’ . . . is taken to be approximately one-490
seventh of the apparent place field (the entire field where rate is elevated)”491
(Lisman and Redish 2009b, p. 1194). Below, though, we will review empirical492
data that seems to support the prediction interpretation as more than a mere493
gloss. It is also possible that there be both downstream consumers for this494
phase-coded information that use it as an aid to prediction or as fine-grained495
information about location (Colgin 2016, p. 245; Maurer and McNaughton496
2007, p. 325f). In the remainder of this section we will stick to prediction.497
The predictive role relies on the fact that neural oscillations at different498
frequencies can be nested, with faster oscillations locked to concrete phases499
of the slower ones. In particular, within a single theta cycle (called a ‘sweep’),500
there can be between 5 and 14 gamma cycles (Lisman and Redish 2009a, p.501
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Figure 5: From Lisman and Redish (2009a, p. 1196)
1194).8 In the current context, this means that a theta sweep accommodates502
a sequence of 5 to 14 place-cell gamma bursts. Lisman and colleagues’ idea503
is that this sequence is used for prediction: the order in which place cells fire504
within a single theta cycle corresponds to the order in which the rat expects505
to visit their place fields.506
Let us consider a particular example. Suppose A, B, C, D, E, F and G507
are the different sections of a path that leads to a certain goal. When the rat508
is in A, the A-, B-, C-, D-, E-, F- and G-cells will fire within a single theta509
cycle, in this order. The A-cell firing early in the theta cycle represents that510
the rat is in A. In contrast, the G-cell firing at the end of the cycle represents511
that the rat is moving towards G. In other words, the order in which cells512
fire within a sweep represents the location of their place field with respect to513
each other. A place cell firing early in the theta cycle represents the actual514
location, whereas firings in later phases of the cycle predict future positions515
(Jensen and Lisman 1996).516
Different kinds of evidence have been presented in support of this hy-517
pothesis. First of all, the postulated predictive role coheres very well with518
accounts of hippocampal memory (Jensen and Lisman 1996; Lenck-Santini,519
Fenton, and Muller 2008): the idea being that prediction relies on the hip-520
pocampus operating in “recall mode” (Jensen and Lisman 1996). There is521
also more direct evidence for a predictive role: as the rat familiarizes itself522
with a certain environment, it should be able to predict its future location523
8. “Seven to nine”, according to Buzsáki (2010, p. 370).
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earlier; and this is indeed what is observed: as rats becomes more famil-524
iar with an environment, more gamma cycles are nested within every theta525
cycle—indicating that prediction starts earlier (Jensen and Lisman 1996).526
There is also evidence that rats make predictions about future locations be-527
fore choosing a path, by relying on this phase-coded information. Johnson528
and Redish (2007) showed that, at bifurcation points in a T-maze, theta529
sweeps go, successively, through the sequence of place fields corresponding530
to both arms, which suggests that the rat evaluates available possibilities in531
advance of deciding.532
Let us suppose that this phase-coding-as-prediction hypothesis is correct:533
a G-cell firing at the beginning of the theta cycle represents that the rat is534
in G, whereas the very same pattern of activity at late stages of the theta535
cycle would instead represent that the rat is heading towards G. In this case,536
it seems that oscillations-involving states such as, e.g., Vehicle below satisfy537
all the requirements for qualifying as representational states:538
Vehicle: G-cells firing early in the theta cycle.539
On the one hand, it is very plausible that Vehicle has a sender—that540
is, an internal mechanism that generates it in response to location-related541
worldly states of affairs.9 There are two main current hypotheses about this542
mechanism: that it relies on two different oscillators, and that it emerges543
from asymmetric connections among place cells (Maurer and McNaughton544
2007). Hybrid models have also been formulated. But our understanding of545
this mechanism is still in flux and, as Maurer and McNaughton note in their546
review, it might “turn out to be extraordinary” (p. 332).10547
Vehicle also has a receiver, as it makes a clear functional difference down-548
stream (again, assuming that the prediction hypothesis is correct): distin-549
guishing a representation of the actual location from a representation of a550
future location the rat will be in. This is made most vivid in the role they551
9. Or perhaps we should think of this case as involving two senders: one in charge of
the actual place cell that gets activated, and another in charge of the phase in which
this activation happens. As far as we know, our current understanding of the relevant
mechanistic details does not allow us to adjudicate this question.
10. The asymmetric-connectivity model is related to the facilitation of long-term potenti-
ation discussed in Subsection 4.3. As far as we are aware, the particular details about how
the look-ahead role can be made compatible with the remapping role are still unknown.
In any event, the provisional consensus appears to be that both roles are compatible (cf.
Colgin 2016).
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seem to play in navigation-related decision making (see above.) We conclude552
that here neural oscillations appear to play a representation-constitutive role,553
rather than just an enabling role. What is their representational content? The554
most plausible reading, as we have argued, is that a late theta phase modifies555
a place-cell representation: G-cell firing in early theta-phases represents that556
the rat already is in G, whereas G-cell firing in late theta-phases represents557
that the rat is moving toward G.558
It could be objected that, in fact, it is just G-cell firings that are properly559
representational, with the background theta oscillation merely providing a560
syntactic scaffolding. After all, it is only place cell firings, not oscillations,561
that carry the relevant information about present and future locations. But562
theta phase does not have a merely syntactical role. Early (late) phases of563
the theta wave have something akin to predicative content:564
λx{I am currently at (moving towards) x}
Another possible deflationary understanding of the role theta phase plays565
is that it is merely contextual: its contribution to the meaning of Vehicle566
would be analogous to the contribution time makes to an utterance such as567
‘Whiskers is at G now ’. While the time at which the utterance is made sup-568
plies the reference for “now”, this is compatible with refraining from claiming569
that time is literally part of the representation. But this is not a good model570
for the role theta phases play: time contributes itself to the meaning of “now”,571
but theta phases are not themselves part of the content—they stand in for572
times, like representations do.573
Finally, phase differences are as information-carrying as firing rates: if we574
want to infer where the rat currently is from hippocampal activity, simply575
focusing on the rate of activation of place cells will not do. We need to take576
into account the phase of activation as well.11577
5.2 Feature Binding578
One of the first modern discussions of the role that synchrony plays in brain579
function is von der Malsburg (1981). Here, von der Malsburg suggests that580
the “correlation between two cellular signals” should be defined “in terms581
of synchrony and asynchrony between spike trains” (we are citing from the582
11. We would like to thank an anonymous reviewer for pressing us on these points.
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4th edition of this paper, von der Malsburg 1994, p. 110). Von der Mals-583
burg presents his synchronicity-based “correlation theory” of brain function584
as a way of solving, among others, the problem of detecting specific percep-585
tual patterns—among the very many possible combinations of colors, shapes,586
movement, etc. that could make up a visual scene. Postulating the existence587
of a set of specialized units that differentially respond to each such pattern588
(the variously called cardinal, gnostic, pontifical or grandmother cells, see589
Quiroga 2013), he claims, will not do, as “the number of [such units] required590
would . . . be forbidding” (von der Malsburg 1994, p. 101). This is known as591
the problem of combinatorial explosion: if we are to keep track of n simulta-592
neous features (color, shape, etc.), each of which could take m values (blue,593
yellow, square, etc.), we would need mn grandmother cells. Synchronization594
between cells, on the other hand, can result in dynamically created “synap-595
tic networks”, in which individual cells respond to rather simple stimuli, but596
which collectively function as “complex composite feature detectors” (p. 112).597
Another important early theory of brain function which predicts a role598
for synchrony in feature binding along these lines is Grossberg’s Adaptive599
Resonance Theory [ART]. In a recent review of ART, Grossberg states that600
Coherent binding of the attended features to the category give601
them a meaning as a context-sensitive “event” rather than as602
just isolated pixels. Such coherent states between distributed fea-603
tures and symbolic categories are often expressed dynamically604
as synchronously oscillating activations across the bound cells605
. . . (Grossberg 2013, p. 9)606
This “coherence between distributed features and symbolic categories” is607
what we would now call feature binding (of the former features into an object608
conceptualized under the latter symbolic category).609
Many experimental results support these ideas: Gray et al. (1989) fa-610
mously demonstrated that oscillatory responses were evoked by stimuli which611
showed coherent motion, but not by stimuli which moved in opposite direc-612
tions (Gray et al. 1989; Gray et al. 1990, p. 335). That is: synchronous activity613
marks the presence of coherent motion, which (as Gestalt theorists suggested)614
is in its turn evidence that the two stimuli in question are not in fact separate615
entities, but belong to one and the same object. Kreiter and Singer (1996)616
showed that two cells with overlapping receptive fields, but such that each617
of them is tuned to a different direction of movement, can be driven to fire618
20
in synchrony by the movement of a single bar, yet not by two bars each one619
moving in the preferred direction of one cell—again here, synchronization620
goes with co-boundedness, even trumping the tuning features of individual621
neurons. Synchronization appears to be responsive to other Gestalt-grouping622
principles as well, besides coherent motion (Singer and Gray 1995; Engel et623
al. 1992; Gray 1999). Tallon-Baudry and Bertrand (1999) review much other624
relevant evidence. Modeling work also supports the link between oscillations625
and feature binding (Eckhorn et al. 1990) and suggests that synchroniza-626
tion can be sufficiently fast in long-range interactions (Yazdanbakhsh and627
Grossberg 2004).628
The most ambitious contemporary version of this binding by synchrony629
[BBS] hypothesis claims that synchrony is the main code for feature binding.630
This seems to be the position taken by proponents of the temporal binding631
model (Engel and Singer 2001; Engel, Fries, and Singer 2001, and papers632
cited therein), who claim that “neural synchrony . . . is crucial for object rep-633
resentation” (Engel, Fries, and Singer 2001, p. 706). There are good reasons634
(both theoretical (Shadlen and Movshon 1999; Di Lollo 2012)12 and empir-635
ical (Palanca and DeAngelis 2005)) to think that synchrony is not the only636
feature-binding code. Still, the results discussed above and many others (in-637
cluding ones by Palanca and DeAngelis in the critical paper just cited) sug-638
gest that it does make a contribution to representing the fact that different639
features are co-bound to the same object (cf. Hommel 2004, Box 1).640
Let us assume that this putative contribution takes the following form:641
“the mechanism that evaluates temporal relations among responses for per-642
ceptual grouping interprets synchronous responses as related and segregates643
them from responses that are temporally offset.” (Singer 1999, p. 51) where,644
as we have just discussed, “interprets” should not be taken to mean that645
synchronicity determines the status of responses as related or unrelated,646
but rather that it provides evidence for it, possibly to be combined with647
other mechanisms such as, e.g., task-dependent alterations in neural tuning648
(Gilbert and Li 2013, p. 5). Should we interpret this less ambitious version649
of BBS as vindicating a representational role for synchrony?650
In a nutshell, the hypothesis is that synchronous activity between two651
populations that code for two different perceptual features would represent652
12. Di Lollo is sceptical about the very existence of a feature-binding problem. He defends
that something like gnostic cells are actually available in the brain, but doesn’t explicitly
discuss how combinatorial explosion is therefore dealt with.
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that these features are co-bound. Again, we unpack this idea by trying to find653
occupants for the different roles in our metasemantic sketch. First, there is a654
plausible occupant for the role of representational vehicle:655
Vehicle: A population of neurons P1 (that encodes a perceptual feature F1)656
and another population P2, (that encodes a perceptual feature F2) firing657
in synchrony.13658
Now, is there a plausible sender/encoder for Vehicle? What this encoder659
has to do is to subsume populations P1 and P2 into a larger coherent assembly,660
as a reaction to the fact that onset and offset of activity in P1 and P2 is more661
or less simultaneous (which in turn is explained by features F1 and F2 being662
actually co-bound in the world, and therefore appearing and disappearing663
more or less simultaneously).664
There are at least two goals that this encoder must meet. First, note that665
the fact that F1 and F2 are reliably co-instantiated is not the same as, nor666
sufficient for, synchrony. Co-instantiation is indeed sufficient for sameness667
of onset and end of firing, but not for the fact that, during the duration668
of the firing episode, this firing is synchronized, which it is, “over periods669
ranging from tens to thousands of milliseconds” (Gray 1999, p. 38), more-670
over showing sophisticated oscillatory structure (Singer and Gray 1995, p.671
1094). Second, this synchronic firing must start quickly and reliably after672
stimulus onset if it is to be an ecologically viable way of signaling feature673
boundedness. This job description is far from computationally trivial, and it674
is met by a rather specific pattern of lateral interconnections in the relevant675
neuronal population, with the right mix of excitation and inhibition (Fries676
2015; Yazdanbakhsh and Grossberg 2004, see Section 4.1 above). This kind677
of network architecture is a good candidate for our sender/encoder.678
There is also a plausible receiver for Vehicle: the whole point of binding679
by synchrony is that dynamic assemblies formed by synchronized neurons are680
treated as a unit. One often proposed mechanism in this connection is that681
coincidence-sensitive neurons (Engel and Singer 2001, p. 18; Abeles 1982;682
König, Engel, and Singer 1996) would be specially driven by neurons fir-683
ing synchronously (see Fries 2015, on effective connectivity). We will discuss684
13. Shouldn’t the vehicle be just the coinstantiation of P1 and P2 firings, rather than
full-blown synchrony? Not according to the defenders of the BBS hypothesis: synchrony
(i.e., rhythmic, congruent activity), and not mere coinstantiation, is necessary to entrain
postsynaptic activity in a sufficiently vigorous way (Fries 2015; Engel, Fries, and Singer
2001, p. 705).
22
“reader-classifiers” of these neuronal assemblies in more detail in Subsec-685
tion 5.3.686
It seems, thus, that in the case of BBS all of the links in our metase-687
mantic sketch have a plausible occupant. We therefore tentatively conclude688
that Vehicle is a representation. Note that here synchrony is not merely an689
enabling mechanism: synchronized oscillations are a constitutive part of the690
representational vehicle. Moreover, and more importantly, these same oscil-691
lations are directly causally involved in the decoding behavior. That is, it is692
by virtue of its oscillatory profile that Vehicle means what it means.693
5.3 Sequences694
An impressive body of work associated mainly (but not only) with György695
Buzsáki’s lab (Buzsáki 2006; 2010; Buzsáki and Watson 2012, among many696
others) has aimed at uncovering “syntactical” units in brain processing: how697
does the brain go about providing vehicles over which computations can be698
performed? As we will see, neural oscillations play an essential role in the699
construction of these various syntactical units. It will turn out, though, that700
there is some, perhaps ineliminable, indeterminacy between taking some cases701
of neural activity as constituting one such unit (e.g., a “neural word”) or as702
a process of computation of one unit from another. In our framework, this703
will translate to indeterminacy in their status as properly representational.704
Constructing these vehicles is a difficult task, if only because it involves705
arbitrating between two desiderata that pull in different directions. First,706
the repertoire of available vehicles needs to be sensitive enough: it should707
be possible to token, reliably, different vehicles in the presence of different,708
but similar, external conditions. Brains need to keep track of fine-grained709
differences in external events (say, in the velocity of looming or receding ob-710
jects, Maier et al. 2004) and this requires provisioning a sufficient number of711
different vehicles to stand in for each member in a sufficiently fine-grained712
partition of such events (say, for a sufficiently fine-grained range of differ-713
ent looming velocities). Note that this sensitivity requirement is not met by714
simply generating states that count as different under some third-personal715
criterion: it must be possible for these different states to make a difference716
to the system itself—they must be possibly treated as different downstream.717
Second, this repertoire needs to be robust enough: the vehicles in question718
need to be somehow resistant to the very noisy environment in which they719
are tokened (see Faisal, Selen, and Wolpert 2008, for a review of noise in the720
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brain). Sensitivity and robustness are in tension: sensitive processing involves721
tokening noticeably different vehicles in response to very similar world states;722
yet, robust processing involves preventing ambient noise from conflating the723
processing trajectories of the vehicles that are triggered by those world states.724
As we are about to see, it has been suggested that neural oscillations play725
an important role in solving this conundrum.726
Buzsáki and colleagues have claimed that the fundamental “syntactical”727
units in brain processing (that is to say, the fundamental unit in the construc-728
tion of vehicles) is not the single neuron but the cell assembly : “a collection729
of neurons that come together . . . to produce a composite downstream effect730
that cannot be produced by single neurons alone” (Buzsáki 2010, p. 364, recall731
that von der Malsburg uses a very similar expression). Because the existence732
of a cell assembly depends on the existence of these “composite downstream733
effects”, there must be a downstream “reader-classifier” that treats the as-734
sembly as a functional unit (ibid.). According to Buzsáki, the most basic735
assembly reader-classifier in the brain is the integration of presynaptic ac-736
tivity : the process whereby a certain neuron treats presynaptic events (say,737
action potentials coming from different presynaptic neurons at slightly differ-738
ent times) as a unit. How far apart from each other these events can be and739
still be treated as a single whole depends on the so-called membrane time740
constant τ (ibid.) but, in general, the closer in time those events are, the741
most likely it will be that they will be treated as a unit. Obviously, a reader-742
classifier such as this one, that mainly detect coincidences in presynaptic743
activity, will greatly benefit from synchronized activity upstream. This is the744
first place where neural oscillations play a role in the generation of vehicles:745
locking presynaptic firings to concrete phases of an oscillation cycle leads to746
postsynaptic neurons treating each such phase-locked collection of firings as747
a functional unit.748
These cell assemblies should be thought of as the phonemes (or perhaps749
letters) of the neural syntax. One step up in the Buzsákian hierarchy of750
vehicles we find neural words, made up of “sequences” of these assemblies,751
quickly following one another through the duration of a (typically gamma)752
cycle (ibid., p. 365). E.g., we can think of a neural word as assemblies A, B,753
C, D succeeding one another through a gamma cycle (each, say, occupying 90754
degrees of the full 360 degrees in a cycle). The sequence consisting of assem-755
blies A, C, D, B would constitute a different word, possibly discharging an756
entirely different processing role. Again, neural words will only be real insofar757
as some entity downstream treats them as a unit: for example, mechanisms758
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with a longer integration window than the membrane time constant, such759
as NMDA or GABAe receptors (ibid., p. 366). A more important, and more760
general, class of reader-classifiers with different integration windows is again761
provided by neural oscillations (ibid.). From the point of view of electronics,762
neural oscillations are relaxation oscillators (Wang 1999): this kind of circuit763
(which is used, for example, in the blinking turn signals of cars) works by764
periodically charging and discharging a capacitor (a storage of electrical en-765
ergy); when the capacitor reaches a certain threshold, the oscillator is “reset”.766
The concept of neural word relies on two features of relaxation oscillators:767
first, the phase during which the capacitor is being charged naturally corre-768
sponds to an integrator window (Buzsáki 2010, p. 366)—recall that this is769
just a period during which incoming neural activity is treated as an undifer-770
entiated whole. Second the oscillator “reset” acts as a natural gap between771
different neural words.772
There is ample empirical evidence of the existence of neural words, under-773
stood along those lines. For example, Jones et al. (2007) show how neurons774
in the gustatory cortex of rats go through four different sequences, each com-775
prised of four different states, whenever the rat is exposed to sweet, bitter,776
sour or salty flavors, respectively. The four states that are part of the se-777
quences are different for different flavors, but always the same within each778
flavor (see figure 6). Laurent (2002, p. 886) similarly reports population-779
level representations in the antennal lobe of insects and the olfactory bulb780
of mammals that are “dynamic, carried by an assembly of neurons . . . that781
evolves in a stimulus-specific manner over time”. In sections 4.3 and 5.1 we782
have reviewed in detail theta sweeps in the hippocampus, which provides yet783
another important example of assembly sequence.784
Further syntactic structure is provided by nested oscillatory rhythms: for785
example, the number of assemblies that fit in a theta cycle has consequences786
for the “memory ‘buffer’ of the gamma-nested theta-cycle” (ibid.). More gen-787
erally, “[theta-gamma] oscillations form a code for representing multiple items788
in an ordered way.” (Lisman and Jensen 2013, p. 1002)789
Now, how do neural vehicles constructed out of these syntactic building790
blocks trade off sensitivity and robustness? First of all, reader-classifiers will791
help with robustness by failing to distinguish between different sequences of792
events (say, different sets of arrival times of presynactic activities) as long as793
they fall within the same activation window—e.g., neuron 1 firing now and794
neurons 2 and 3 firing in the next 5ms will be indistinguishable from neuron795
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Figure 6: Neural words in the gustatory cortex. From Jones et
al. (2007)
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3 firing now and neurons 1 and 2 firing in the next 5ms.14 As for sensitivity,796
the production of sequences might be such that initially minute differences in797
input are taken, as more evidence comes in, into rapidly divergent trajecto-798
ries corresponding to different sequences that are much easier to distinguish:799
those initially minute differences, for example, might result in two different800
sequences with an overlapping initial part, as in the ABCD / ACBD example801
above (Harvey, Coen, and Tank 2012).802
The most straightforward way to think of these neural words is as repre-803
sentational vehicles: they are hypothesized to solve a problem (the sensitivity804
/ robustness tradeoff) that is precisely the kind of problem a representational805
system in a noisy environment would face. Furthermore, the empirical evi-806
dence for neural words links them in every case to concrete representational807
roles (the representation of flavors in Jones et al. (2007), odorants in Laurent808
(2002), or paths to be taken in space in Jensen and Lisman (1996)).809
Still, closer examination of the available evidence, and the attitude of810
researchers toward that evidence, reveals that this representational reading811
is not without problems. First, note that the mechanisms through which,812
we suggested, sensitivity and robustness are accommodated by neural words813
are somewhat at odds with one another: robustness depended on a reader-814
classifier with a large enough activation window that it may be able to take815
the full neural word in as a unified whole; while sensitivity depended on816
neural words being interpreted as diverging trajectories—crucially, their di-817
achronic unfolding, and their responsiveness to incoming evidence that co-818
heres with the trajectory chosen, is part of what makes them robust. Indeed,819
many researchers are skeptical that sequences have readers of their own. So,820
for example, according to Lauren Jones and colleagues, “[c]oherent state se-821
quences . . . probably do not represent pure ‘sensory codes’ to be interpreted by822
downstream ‘grandmother neurons’ ” Jones et al. (2007, p. 18776, emphasis823
added). According to these researchers, the sequences we see in sensory corti-824
cal ensembles should be interpreted, not as pure codes, but as computations825
of motor codes from purely sensory ones.826
Laurent (2002), on the other hand, claims that sequences of assemblies827
do play a role in generating a “ large coding space in which to spread repre-828
sentation clusters” (ibid., p. 885f, emphasis added). While this is one of the829
main points of his paper, highlighted in abstract and conclusions, Laurent830
14. This is just a straightforward example of what information theorists call channel
coding, or error correction (MacKay 2003).
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also warns that, conceivably, “slow temporal patterns, although crucial for831
the separation of representations, are never actually decoded as such. More832
generally, the creation of spatiotemporal representations by circuit dynam-833
ics might be a transient phase in signal processing, used simply to spread834
out those representations in a larger coding space and to facilitate decoding”835
(ibid., p. 891, emphasis added). That is, it is not clear that the olfaction-836
related neural sequences in insects and mammals that Laurent is interested837
in have receivers—i.e., are pure sensory codes. Rather, they would amount838
to encoding stages along which representational vehicles are progressively839
optimized.840
This hybrid (part code, part encoding process) nature of spatio-temporal841
sequences is fleshed out most clearly by Harvey, Coen, and Tank (2012).842
They show that an ideal observer is able to predict behavioral choices in843
mice from spatio-temporal neural sequences but not from the synchronic844
behavior of neuronal populations (see also Yuste 2015, p. 492). The model845
proposed by Harvey and colleagues is one in which incoming sensory informa-846
tion initiates a (firstly decision-agnostic) sequence which gets progressively847
decision-specific as incoming information modifies it. When the sequence848
overlaps sufficiently with a decision-specific trajectory, this corresponds to849
the personal-level state of the mouse having decided. The subsequent, en-850
dogenously generated unfolding of the decision-specific sequence corresponds851
to the personal-level state of keeping the decision in mind.852
The upshot of this discussion is that, while very prominent models of brain853
function accord an important role to neural oscillations in the generation of854
representational vehicles, there is some vacillation in the literature regard-855
ing what counts as code (of incoming sensory information); what counts as856
computation (of decisions from sensory information); and what counts as en-857
coding processes (whereby sensory codes gets optimized into decision codes).858
This indeterminacy between merely enabling and properly representational859
status for neural-sequence-related oscillations will perhaps be remedied as860
our knowledge of brain processing improves; perhaps it is ineliminable.861
6 Conclusion862
The main goal of this paper was to examine whether neural oscillations in863
the brain actually are representations. As we have seen, whether they do864
often depends on rather intricate facts about the relevant mechanisms where865
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they participate, and the role they play in these mechanisms. We offer this866
to philosophers as a cautionary tale: representational status, like the devil,867
is often in the detail.868
But we can also glean a few big-picture lessons from the foregoing discus-869
sion. First, our results shows that the core metaphysical theory of content870
put forward in Section 2 is a useful tool for understanding and modelling neu-871
ral representations. It suggests important questions, and provides theoretical872
instruments with which to answer them.873
Secondly, the discussion of case studies revealed that neural oscillations874
can play at least two different roles, enabling and properly representational, in875
the implementation of representations in the brain. This distinction is a result876
of the careful consideration of specific cases, rather than a pre-conceived anal-877
ysis. We hypothesize that this distinction will also apply to the mechanisms878
subserving other representational phenomena; and that it can potentially be879
extended by considering other roles that cognitive processes can play that are880
not representational, but are defined in relation to properly representational881
states.882
Thirdly, following a recent call for multi-level analysis (Craver 2007;883
Boone and Piccinini 2016), our results show that paying attention to imple-884
mentational details is relevant for understanding higher-order levels. Even885
though ‘representation’ is a functional category, considering which specific886
brain structure actually play a representational role can help us vindicate a887
particular analysis of the nature of representation and distinguishes different888
non-representational roles brain states can play, among others.889
Finally, against recent suggestions to the contrary, we argued that low-890
level processes can qualify as representational. Furthermore, this result has891
not been obtained by defining representation so cheaply that just anything892
can count as such, since we have identified some processes employing os-893
cillations in which they fail to play a representational role (e.g. attention,894
retrieval and encoding). The results of this paper support the idea that rep-895
resentations can be found all the way down without trivializing this notion.896
This provides some vindication for naturalistic theories of representation.15897
15. For discussion of the objection that naturalistic theories of content are too liberal,
see Artiga (2016, 2020).
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